The Nature of Anti-Globalism Today – The Case of Populist Parties in Europe
Critical Globalization
A robust resistance to the forces of globalization has manifested itself through the electoral support garnered by anti-globalist parties. The emergence and ascendance of these populist and anti-globalist political entities represent a relatively recent phenomenon that has gained momentum since 2007. These parties span the political spectrum, positioning themselves on both the far-right and far-left, albeit with distinct motivations. This corpus will examine the surge of these parties in Spain, Greece, and France, endeavouring to elucidate the reasons and mechanisms behind their rise.
The Emergence of Anti-Globalist Populist Parties
To comprehend the ascent of anti-globalist populist parties, particularly within the European context, it is imperative to elucidate the concept of globalization itself. The term “Globalization” was initially embraced in the 1990s, coinciding with the rapid global interconnection facilitated by the unfettered flow of economic trade. While global interconnectivity is not a novel phenomenon, the concept of globalization, articulated by Mies (1999), represents a paradigm shift characterized by adopting neoliberal economic policies aimed at dismantling protectionist regulations, tariffs, and rules. Three significant factors facilitated this rapid transformation: the long-term political strategy to supplant post-1945 Keynesian economics with neoliberalism, advances in communication technology, and the disintegration of socialism in Eastern Europe.
This integration, coupled with apprehensions about the erosion of national sovereignty and the dilution of distinctive national identities, laid the groundwork for the emergence of anti-globalist populist parties. This burgeoning crisis within European politics stands as one of the most profound challenges that Europe has ever confronted. The ascent of new anti-globalist populist parties poses a substantial threat to established mainstream political parties and the two-party systems across the European Union. Western European politics, in particular, finds itself trapped in a tumultuous state characterized by:
“The throes of a political identity crisis. The disruptive impacts of globalization, the ongoing retrenchment of welfare states, and the advent of a ‘media audience democracy’ accompanied by fundamental transformations in the political landscape. The triumph of the floating voter, signifying an unprecedented surge in electoral volatility, along with the remarkable emergence of neo-populist movements within the political arena.” (Cuperus, 2007).
These dynamics have engendered pervasive instability in various facets of life, ranging from labour and family structures to cultural norms. The resultant decline in political representation has given rise to a fragile framework within the European welfare states and the party democracies (Cuperus, 2007).
The rise of populist parties in Europe, whether on the far-left or far-right of the political spectrum, can be encapsulated as “a distinctive mode of political discourse that frames society as a homogeneous collective pitted against a ‘corrupt elite.’ In this narrative, neo-populist citizens rise in rebellion, rooted in the perception that the ruling elites have ‘betrayed’ the people’s interests” (Cuperus, 2007).
The ideology of populist parties rests upon the belief that society can be dichotomized into two ostensibly similar yet inherently adversarial groups: the ‘pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite.’ Consequently, they argue that politics should serve as “an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004).
While this portrayal may appear somewhat exaggerated, it serves as another vantage point to comprehend the resonance of populist parties. In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, Europe confronted and continues to confront one of the most profound backlashes against globalization to date (Berezin, 2013).
Who Comprises the Far-Right and Far-Left Anti-Globalist Parties?
In categorising alternative political parties in Europe, the far-right segment stands out, particularly for its pronounced opposition to the European Union (EU). For these parties, opposition to the EU has evolved into a central tenet of their policy platform. They have sought to broaden their domestic appeal beyond their traditional emphasis on anti-immigrant sentiments. Notably, parties like the French National Front have a longstanding history of engaging in anti-globalist discourse and espousing Eurosceptic rhetoric (Underwood, 2013).
Far-right parties have often found themselves in the media spotlight, mainly due to the erroneous perception that they maintain pro-Russian, xenophobic, and anti-immigrant stances. Within the scope of this paper, our focus will be directed exclusively towards the National Front (NF) of France.
On the other end of the political spectrum, the far-left parties venture beyond the confines of mainstream left politics. They oppose the neoliberal trajectory they perceive European integration to be following. They assert that the EU increasingly operates as a club for capitalists, advancing capitalist interests. These far-left parties have achieved considerable electoral success in recent years, championing an alternative vision that envisions a more socially-oriented Europe with a coherent global perspective (Underwood, 2013). The onset of Greece’s political and economic turmoil amid the Eurozone Crisis has been a fertile ground for the political ascent of these parties.
When examining anti-globalization movements, a noteworthy commonality emerges: the far-left and far-right are unified in their anti-globalist stance. Those on the far left of the political spectrum often operate outside the established political institutions, occasionally aligning themselves with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These parties frequently exhibit a proclivity for “expressive public demonstrations and disruptive tactics” (Berezin, 2013).
In contrast, those aligned with the far-right political spectrum tend to follow a more conventional path by working within established political institutions, particularly nationalist political parties and electoral systems. However, despite these strategic differences, both the far-left and far-right share a common “mutual aversion” towards the prevailing narrative of globalization and its associated notions of progress (Berezin, 2013).
The Greek Crisis and the Emergence of Far-Left and Far-Right Parties
The Global Financial Crisis, which commenced in 2007, bore profound political and economic repercussions for Greece. The surge in popularity of both far-left and far-right political movements directly emanated from the tumultuous aftermath of this crisis. Greece’s tribulations, which took root in 2009, would ultimately plunge the nation into substantial economic and political disarray.
As articulated by a noted source, “Seven years have elapsed, and the Greek landscape remains ensnared in an unrelenting economic tempest, with no discernible signs of recovery. Five electoral contests have transpired since 2009, resulting in four different prime ministers (PMs) endeavoring to steer the country back on course, all while contending with a highly fragmented and volatile party system” (Stavrakakis, 2014).
The financial upheaval besieging Greece gave rise to populist and Eurosceptic parties on the far left with Syriza and on the far right with Anel and Golden Dawn. These political movements reverberated within Greece and sent shockwaves throughout the European Union.
Syriza, the far-left political entity, emerged on the Greek political scene in 2012 in response to the globalist influence wielded over Greece by the Troika, comprising the European Central Bank, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund. Syriza’s ascent can be directly attributed to Greece’s mounting debt and the ensuing economic crisis.
Following Stavrakakis (2014) and its remarkable performance in the general elections in 2012, Syriza swiftly emerged as a formidable force within the European public sphere. This previously obscure political faction effectively tapped into the prevailing sentiments of anger and mistrust that pervaded Greek society, directed towards the Greek government and the European Union.
The meteoric electoral success achieved by Syriza was virtually unparalleled in modern Greek, if not European, political annals. “Within an astonishingly brief timeframe, Syriza’s vote share soared from 4.60 per cent to an astounding 26.89 per cent, constituting an electoral leap of unprecedented proportions” (Stavrakakis, 2014).
The current Greek Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, leveraged his influence and charisma to propel Syriza to this remarkable triumph, which had profound ramifications for Greece and the broader European Union. Subsequently, Syriza secured another electoral victory in 2015 and formed a coalition government with the populist radical right Independent Greeks (Anel), marking the inception of the first-ever “governing alliance between left-wing and right-wing populist parties in Europe” (Aslanidis, 2016).
As a coalition partner, Anel represents a relatively novel far-right political entity. “The Independent Greeks (Anel), under the leadership of Panos Kammenos, a recent convert to far-right politics, emerged as another influential proponent of the emerging populism. In June 2012, his party garnered 7.5 per cent of the votes, a slightly diminished share compared to the 10.6 per cent achieved in May. Kammenos’s impassioned parliamentary speeches gained widespread popularity on YouTube.
Kammenos managed to maintain a strong foothold among the conservative electorate, preventing them from gravitating further to the right” (Papas, 2015). His adept use of media provided a platform for those who felt marginalized, enabling them to have their voices heard, thus alleviating their sense of neglect. Anel’s emergence marked the ascendance of a populist radical right-wing party devoid of “violent extremist inclinations” (Papas, 2015). Anel’s autonomy presented an alternative to the far-left Syriza and the far-right Golden Dawn.
Anel’s rhetoric aligns closely with that typically associated with the far-right. For instance, Anel advocates for allocating a fixed quota for immigrants, not exceeding 2.5 per cent of the total population. Anel promotes a mixed stance in economic matters, advocating for corporate taxes as low as 8 per cent and a maximum 10 per cent VAT rate, primarily to stimulate economic activity and foster export-oriented growth (Papas, 2015).
This rhetorical position facilitated Anel’s role as a coalition partner with the far-left Syriza. It represented an unprecedented instance wherein two polar extremes, the far-left and the far-right, joined forces to form a governing coalition in a nation’s political landscape.
Another far-right political entity, Golden Dawn, has made inroads into Greek politics. Unlike Anel, Golden Dawn is a more established party whose origins date back to 1983. The party’s statutes from 1987 underscored its commitment to promoting a European Civilization, a vision that resembles the right-wing National Front in France. This European orientation reflects Golden Dawn’s awareness of contemporary European developments associated with forming the “New Right” (Lampe, 2014).
Golden Dawn achieved limited political success throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. The party’s ideological stance elucidates why it initially struggled at the polls:
“First, it vehemently opposed the bailout agreement brokered by the Greek government with the Troika. Second, it propagated antisemitic views and rejected immigration on the premise of alleged alterations immigrants purportedly inflicted upon the Greek nation, suggesting its dissolution.
Third, Golden Dawn embraced a pro-nationalist agenda underpinned by neoliberal attitudes concerning protecting individual and collective interests. Fourth, it called for a radical societal transformation grounded in the tenets of nationalism. Fifth, while officially disavowing national socialism, it internally invoked Greek racial identity with distinct characteristics” (Lampe, 2014).
The party’s early electoral fortunes remained meagre. However, the turning point came in the 2010 general elections when Golden Dawn’s party leader secured 5.29 per cent of the total seats in the Athens council (Lampe, 2014). Subsequently, in the May 2012 general elections, Golden Dawn garnered 6.97 per cent of the total votes. This surge can be attributed to the growing preference of many voters for extremist parties in the wake of the crisis (Lampe, 2014).
Golden Dawn’s sudden ascent seemed to arrive finally, marked by its consistent electoral gains in subsequent Greek elections. Golden Dawn achieved notable milestones in the ensuing electoral contests, which saw it compete against Anel on the far right and Syriza on the far left. In the May 2014 elections, the party secured 9.4 per cent of the vote and elected three members to the European Parliament.
In the subsequent snap elections held in January and September 2015, the party maintained a substantial share of the vote, receiving 6.3 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively, and securing 17 and 18 seats in the 300-member parliament. Consequently, Golden Dawn emerged as the third-largest political party in Greece (Ellinas, 2016).
Spain and the Emergence of Podemos on the Far-Left
Podemos bears similarities to other populist parties that surged across Europe in 2014. In the 2014 European Elections, a novel political entity, Podemos, ascended to prominence in Spain. Merely three months following its inception, the party secured five seats in the European Parliament. By December 2015, Podemos had garnered an impressive 20.66 per cent of the vote share in the Spanish National Elections, propelling it to become the third-largest political party in Spain’s landscape (Casero-Ripollés, 2016).
This swift emergence of the Spanish party posed an immediate challenge to the established mainstream parties within Spanish politics. The European elections held in May 2014 yielded an astonishing outcome: Podemos garnered over 1,245,948 votes, constituting 7.89 per cent of the total vote. Amid a dynamic political milieu, Podemos secured the fourth-best performance (Casero-Ripollés, 2016). The rapid surge in popularity and electoral support was unprecedented in Spanish political history.
Podemos’ ideological stance reveals a considerable alignment with other left-leaning populist parties, such as Greece’s Syriza (Casero-Ripollés, 2016). As Casero-Ripollés (2016) contends, Podemos “is at the vanguard in redefining and reevaluating leftist politics, including its media strategies, messaging, and concerns,” particularly concerning anti-globalization.
Before the emergence of Podemos, the Spanish political landscape was characterized by a two-party system akin to that of the United States. However, with Podemos’ ascendancy in the 2015 general elections, a system entrenched since the restoration of democracy in Spain came to a definitive end (Orriols, 2016). This seismic shift reverberated throughout the Spanish political arena, ushering in a new era marked by the ascendancy of third-party politics.
From 1982 to 2015, the Spanish party system was chiefly defined by a duopolistic rivalry between the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español – PSOE, Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) and the PP (People’s Party – Partido Popular) (Orriols, 2016). However, the rise of Podemos in the 2015 general election dismantled this prevailing two-party system, giving rise to widespread voter discontent with the established political order.
France and the Emergence of the National Front on the Far-Right
The National Front made its mark on French politics in the 2012 elections. During the initial round of the 2012 French presidential election, Marine Le Pen emerged as a formidable contender, amassing a record-breaking vote share of 17.9 per cent (Mayer, 2013).
The surging support for the National Front manifested in a series of electoral gains: from 10.4 per cent in the 2007 presidential race to 11.4 per cent in the 2010 regional elections, 15 per cent in the 2011 cantonal elections, 17.9 per cent in the 2012 presidential election, and 13.6 per cent in the ensuing legislative elections (Mayer, 2013).
The inception of the National Front in French politics can be traced back to its establishment in 1972 under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen. Though the party’s first electoral success dates back to 1984, its voter base had long exhibited a discernible right-wing orientation (Mayer, 2013).
Remarkably, the National Front took nearly three more decades to attain recognition as a potent political force. In the 2002 presidential election, Jean-Marie Le Pen gained traction among rural and small-town voters concerned about spreading crime and delinquency beyond the major cities and their suburbs. Among farmers, Le Pen’s popularity doubled, rising from 10 per cent in 1995 to 22 per cent in 2002, a trend mirrored among small shopkeepers, artisans, manual workers, and non-manual clerical employees (Mayer, 2013).
The National Front espoused anti-globalist and anti-European sentiments even in its early stages. The party’s 1986 platform introduced the initial set of protectionist measures aimed at curtailing the importation of agricultural commodities while emphasizing France’s imperative need for food self-sufficiency. This nationalistic tone foreshadowed a more substantive shift in policy during the mid-1990s. During this period, the National Front tempered its endorsement of free-market capitalism in favour of a protectionist agenda. This strategic shift aligned with the party’s platform opposing EU federalism and the perceived erosion of national sovereignty (Ivaldi, 2015).
As the French Presidential Election approached in April 2017, with the runoff scheduled for May, Marine Le Pen, the National Front’s candidate, appeared poised for a strong performance. This anticipation was informed by the party’s robust showing in the 2014 European Parliament elections, where it emerged as France’s leading party in the EP. French journalist Pierre Haski noted in 2014, “Marine Le Pen has long anticipated the discomfort of the two main parties. It is a marketing ploy that has captivated the voters’ imaginations.”
According to Fred Imbart (2017) of CNBC, “French elections typically unfold in two rounds. Recent polls suggest that Le Pen (National Front) will prevail in the initial round of voting, slated for April 23, albeit losing in the May 7 run-off against the second-place finisher from the first round.” Le Pen and the National Front have narrowed the gap in French public opinion, raising the prospect of a significant upset in the forthcoming 2017 French Presidential Elections.
Conclusion
The surge of the anti-globalist movement is sweeping across Europe, catalyzed by the Global Financial Crisis that unfolded between 2007 and 2009 and compounded by the 2015 refugee crisis within the European Union. What makes this movement particularly intriguing is its ability to span the political spectrum, encompassing both the far left and the far right.
In France, the National Front, under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, is poised for a strong performance in the 2017 French presidential elections, fueled in part by the aftermath of the 2015 Refugee Crisis and the ongoing social unrest in Paris. The nation grapples with persistent riots, necessitating heightened security measures. Le Pen’s platform staunchly opposes open borders and globalist policies.
Greece is a unique case with a coalition of far-left and far-right elements. Far-left Syriza and far-right Anel emerged after the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis. Syriza’s remarkable success can be attributed to Greece’s instability, exacerbated by the European Union’s ill-fated policies and globalism. In 2017, the country remains mired in financial turmoil, indebted to international creditors, with limited sovereignty over its internal affairs.
Spain has witnessed the ascent of the far-left anti-globalist party Podemos, which has gained popularity owing to voters’ dissatisfaction with the prevailing two-party system, perceived as unrepresentative of the average citizen.
While this paper primarily delves into the rise of anti-globalist parties in Greece, Spain, and France, it is essential to acknowledge the global prevalence of anti-globalism. In 2016, the United Kingdom embarked on the path to Brexit, formally leaving the European Union on June 23. This momentous decision was championed by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), led by Nigel Farage, a staunch nationalist, anti-globalist, and EU sceptic. Farage viewed globalism, EU encroachment, and mass migration as existential threats to the UK, while the British electorate saw Brexit as an opportunity to reclaim their sovereignty.
The United States witnessed one of its most contentious presidential elections in history. American voters elected Donald J. Trump as the 45th President over Hillary Clinton through the electoral process. Many Americans perceived Clinton as a corrupt politician with disdain for most of the populace. Clinton, a mainstream globalist candidate, advocated for open borders. Ultimately, President Trump’s victory was propelled by his nationalistic, anti-globalist “Make America Great Again” message, resonating with a significant portion of the electorate who had lost faith in mainstream elitist politicians.
The once-cherished dream of a one-world globalist order championed by politicians and governments shows signs of erosion. People are weary of losing their national identities, traditions, and values and are rallying against foreign cultures that clash with their way of life. The failed political correctness and multiculturalism policies have left people yearning to regain control of their nations. Is globalism at its twilight? Will it ultimately prevail? Only time will unveil the answers to these questions.